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rhe

the

Curtis also showed that all of L&N's experts' testimony
should have been excluded because the testimony did not aid the
jury in understanding the evidence or in determining the facts at
issue.

Rather, the testimony was based on experiments dissimilar

to the actual accident conditions.
In its answering Brief, L&N implicitly admits that there
was no foundation for the experiments and the experts1 conclusions.
Nowhere in its Brief does L&N attempt to justify the substance of
its experts' testimony.

However, L&N says that Curtis failed to

object to the experts' qualifications or foundation (Appellee's
Brief, pp. 8-9) .

L&N also said that there was no plain error by

the lower court, so Curtis waived his right to challenge the
findings of the expert testimony (Appellee's Brief, pp. 12-13).
L&N summarizes:
Plaintiff's [Curtis'] . . . failure to
properly and specifically object to the
testimony of defendant's experts at the trial
constitutes a waiver of any claim of error on
review. The lower court did not commit plain
error in permitting the testimony of experts
properly presented and qualified without so
much as one objection from plaintiff.
L&N also contends that the last-minute testimony was
proper because it says (1) there was no new Scheduling Order after
the trial was continued in March of 1993; and (2) Rules 4-502(2),
16, 26 and 3 3 do not apply.

L&N also argues that Rahmeyer's

2

testimony was proper rebuttal testimony (Appellee's Brieff pp. 1920) .
Finally, L&N claims that Curtis failed to marshall all of
the evidence and show that the jury would have reached a different
verdict if the testimony of the two experts was not permitted.
This Reply Brief addresses L&N's arguments.
IV.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
Curtis Properly Objected to the
Lack of Foundation for L&N's Experts' Testimony.
Contrary to the assertions in L&N's Brief, Curtis did
object to the lack of foundation for L&N's experts' testimony.
However, the objection was overruled.
not necessary.

Once the court has

Subsequent objections were
clearly

ruled, repeated

objections only waste the court's time and prejudice the objecting
party in the eyes of the jury.

M. H. Graham, Handbook of Federal

Evidence. Section 103.2 at 16 (3d ed., 1991).
POINT II
The Lower Court Committed Plain Error
When It Allowed L&N's Experts to Testify.
Plain error is obvious error that is harmful.
State v, Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah 1989).

E,Q'C ,

In this case, the

lower court committed two obvious errors when it allowed both of
L&N's experts to testify.

First, the testimony could not possibly
3

comply with U.R.E. 702. Testimony on the slipperiness of ordinary
surfaces is testimony on a subject commonly understood by the jury,
and is excluded. Second, Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp.r
801 P.2d 920, 923 (Utah 1990), unequivocally holds that for tests
or experiments to be admissible, the tests must be conducted under
conditions substantially similar to those of the accident.

Thus,

L&N's experts should not have been allowed to describe their wet
mat experiments and give their conclusions derived from those
experiments.
That the errors were harmful is also obvious. By use of
the improper experiments and testimony, L&N's experts convinced the
jury that Curtis was less likely to slip on a wet surface than on
a dry one.

Thus, L&N could not have been negligent in placing a

wet mat in front of Curtis1 office, nor could a wet mat have caused
Curtis to slip and fall.
POINT III
Rahmeyer's Testimony Was Not
Proper Rebuttal Testimony.
L&N is wrong when it says that the last-minute surprise
testimony of Dr. Rahmeyer was proper rebuttal testimony.

A

comparison of the Curtis deposition taken on September 29, 1992,
more than a year prior to trial, and the testimony given at trial
shows that Curtis had not substantively changed his description of

4

the slip and fall.

Simply put, Curtis1 trial testimony did not

necessitate rebuttal testimony from L&N's surprise expert.
POINT IV
The Record Unquestionably Demonstrates
That L&N Did Not Timely Disclose
Dr. Rahmeyer As Its Second Expert Witness
And That Curtis Was Prejudiced
By the Last-Minute Disclosure.
Contrary to the claim of proper and timely disclosure
contained in L&N's Brief, the record as summarized in Point IV of
this Brief demonstrates that L&N did not timely disclose Drc
Rahmeyer as an expert witness.

The record also demonstrates that

Curtis was prejudiced by the late disclosure.
V.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
Curtis Properly Objected to the Lack
Of Foundation for L&N's Experts' Testimony.
A.

Appellee's Brief
Nowhere in its Brief does L&N attempt to defend the

content of its two experts' testimony presented at trial. That is^
nowhere does L&N argue that the expert testimony offered by Gordon
and Rahmeyer complies with U.R.E. 702.

Nor does L&N attempt to

justify the flawed experiments or the conclusions drawn from them.
Instead, L&N says that Curtis, "failed to raise or lodge any

5

objection whatsoever to the trial testimony of defendant's experts"
(Brief of Appellee, p. 8; see also pp. 12, 14).
B.

Discussion
L&N is wrong when it alleges that Curtis did not object

to the lack of foundation for the expert testimony offered by L&N.
L&N's first expert, Pete Gordon, the mat manufacturer's employee,
was called to determine and testify on the slip resistance of a wet
mat on a vinyl floor.

He was to evaluate whether or not the wet

mat would be a safe mat (R. 1221, Ins. 16-24).

After describing

his experiment, an experiment L&N does not deny was dissimilar to
the

actual

accident

conditions,

L&N

asked

Gordon

for

his

conclusions.
Q:

Do other manufacturers agree with
Kleentex that mats can safely be put
in service without being dried?

A:

Yes sir.

(R. 1232, Ins. 1-3.)
Because the Gordon experiment was not similar to the
conditions of the accident, Curtis properly objected on the basis
of no foundation for the expert's conclusion.
Mr. Gray:

Objection, no foundation.
I
would like some foundation for
this.

(R. 1232, Ins. 4-5.)

6

However,

the

court

overruled

the

objection

and

incorrectly ruled that the lack of foundation was a matter for
cross-examination•
The Court:

Overruled.

It is a matter for

cross-examination.
(R. 1232, Ins. 6-7.)
However, the lower court was wrong when it ruled that the
lack of foundation was a matter for cross-examination. See Edwards
v. Didericksen, 597 P.2d 1328, 1331-32 (Utah 1979).

Before expert

testimony can be admitted, it must meet the requirements of U.R.E.
702.

That is, the court must find that scientific, technical or

other special knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or determine a fact in issue.

Id.

In addition, the improper foundation offered and used by
L&N, that is, the dissimilar experiments, also were not a matter
for

cross-examination.

The

criteria

for

establishing

the

admissibility of test evidence is that the data must be relevant
and the test must be conducted under conditions substantially
similar to those of the actual accident.

Whitehead v. American

Motor Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920 (Utah 1990).

The lower court's

failure to correctly apply the foregoing criteria is reversible
error.

Id.
Moreover,

Curtis1

foundation issue for appeal.

objection

preserved

the

lack

of

A subsequent objection was not
7

necessary.

See also, Onveabor v. Pro-Roofing. Inc.r 787 P.2d 525,

528 (Utah App. 1990) (a matter is sufficiently raised if it is
submitted to the trial court and the trial court is offered an
opportunity to rule on the issue).

Simply put, once a party has

objected and attained a ruling clearly indicating the attitude of
the court, the party is not required to repeat the objection during
the examination of the same witness or another witness each time
the issue comes up.

Once the court has clearly ruled, repeat

objections serve only to waste the courtfs time and prejudice the
objecting party in the eyes of a jury.

E.g. United States v.

Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 695 (5th Cir. 1978); Ladd, Common Mistakes
in the Technigue of Trial, 22 Iowa Law Review 609 (1937) .
As set forth on pages 22-24 of the Appellant's opening
Brief, the substance and structure of Rahmeyer's testimony was
similar and cumulative to Gordon's testimony.

Thus, no useful

purpose would have been served by Curtis objecting again to a lack
of foundation for the Rahmeyer testimony.

In short, the lower

court had already ruled and indicated its attitude that a lack of
foundation was a matter for cross-examination.

8

POINT II
The Lower Court Committed Plain Error
When It Allowed L&N's Experts to Testify.
A.

Appellee's Brief
On page 13 of its Brief, L&N alleges that there was no

plain error committed by the court. However, L&N does not cite any
legal or factual support for its allegation. Nor does L&N show why
the testimony

describing

the experiments not similar to the

accident conditions and the conclusions based on the experiments
was proper. Instead, L&N incorrectly alleges that since Curtis did
not properly and specifically object to the two experts' testimony,
the lower court must not have committed plain error (Appellee's
Brief, p. 13). However, as hereinafter set forth, plain error is
not disproved when a party fails to make an objection.

Instead,

the plain error doctrine comes into play when a party neglects to
make a timely objection.
B.

Discussion
1.

The Plain Error Criteria

The policy considerations underlining the plain error
rule were explained by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Eldredae,
773 P.2d 29, 36 (1989), as follows:

[T]he premise of [Utah] Rule [of Evidence]
103 (d) is that the ends of justice must not be
lost sight of in the pursuit of procedural
regularity in that when an error is plain, a
trial court can legitimately be said to have
had a reasonable opportunity to address and
9

correct it,
objection.

even

in

the

absence

of

an

The Eldredae court went on to explain that the first
requirement for finding a plain error is that the error be plain,
and that from an examination of the record the reviewing court must
be able to say that it should have been obvious to the trial court
that it had committed an error. Id. at 35. Factors in determining
whether

an

error

is obvious

include

whether

an

evidentiary

requirement is in writing and expressly requires conduct which the
court does not follow and whether the trial court has the benefit
of an appellate decision on the evidentiary problem at hand.

Id.

The second somewhat interrelated requirement for finding plain
error is that the error be harmful.

Id.

Applying the foregoing criteria to the case at bar shows
that the lower court committed two obvious errors.

First, the

lower court allowed L&N's experts to testify on the slipperiness of
wet rugs and wet floors, even though the testimony could not
possibly assist the jury to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact issue as required by U.R.E. 702.

Slipperiness of ordinary

surfaces is a subject commonly described by lay witnesses and
understood by the jury. For that reason, it is excluded. Wolfe v.
Bertrand Bowling Lanes, Inc.. 351 N.E.2d 313, 321 (111. App. 1976).
Moreover, allowing L&Nfs experts to describe their experiments was
also plain error.

Whitehead v« American Motors Sales Corp., 801
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P.2d 920, 931 (Utah 1990) , unequivocally holds that tests are to be
conducted under conditions substantially similar to those of the
actual occurrence.

As set forth on pages 30-34 of Appellant's

opening Brief, the experiments conducted by Gordon and Rahmeyer
were not similar to the slip and fall accident.
In addition to the foregoing errors being obvious, they
were also harmful.

L&N is mistaken when it alleges that Curtis

must marshall all of the evidence and show that the jury would have
reached

a different

permitted

result

if the

expert

(Brief of Appellee, pp. 20-21).

testimony

was not

The requirement to

marshall the evidence occurs in those appeals wherein the basis of
the appeal is insufficient evidence to support the verdict.

See,

e.g. , Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 799-800 (Utah
1991).

However, when, as in this case, the appeal is based on the

court's allowance or disallowance of expert testimony, the test is
whether the error was a substantial influence in bringing about a
different verdict.

E.g., Redevelopment Agency v. Tanner, 740 P.2d

1296, 1303-1304 (Utah 1987).

In this case, there is no doubt that

the improper expert testimony led to a verdict different than would
have occurred if the testimony had properly been excluded.

L&N

Uniform Supply Co. won this case because of one, and only one,
reason — by the improper use of expert testimony —

it was able to

convince a jury that Curtis was less likely to slip if his boots,
and/or mat, and/or floor were wet rather than dry.
11

Absent the

improper testimony, the jury would have easily concluded that
placing a wet mat in front of Curtis' office was negligent and
caused him to slip and fall.
POINT III
Rahmeyer's Testimony Was Not
Proper Rebuttal Testimony.
In its Brief, L&N says that Dr. Rahmeyer's testimony was
proper rebuttal testimony. L&N alleges that Curtis' description of
his slip and fall at trial changed from the description given in
his deposition and that Rahmeyer was retained as a rebuttal witness
to address the possibility of Curtis slipping on the wet mat (Brief
of Appellee, p. 19) . In the lower court, L&N told the same story.
The Court:

Is the expert a rebuttal
testimony witness?

Mr. Christensen:

He is, your Honor.
At
this juncture he is in
rebuttal to the testimony
of Erman Curtis, which is
was presented this
afternoon.

The Court:

What testimony is that?

Mr. Christensen:

That is, in Mr. Curtis'
deposition, and through
the entire course of this
lawsuit,
he
has
maintained the position
that the rug
slipped
underneath him. And his
testimony today, he made
reference to the fact
that
he
wasn't
sure
whether his foot slipped

12

on the rug or whether it
was the rug that slipped.
(R. 1100.)
And in the lower court, Curtis' counsel told the court
that Curtis' description of the slip and fall had not changed, so
Rahmeyer could not be a rebuttal witness.
The Court:

Why
wouldn't
it
be
appropriate
rebuttal
testimony
to
have
an
expert address both of
those issues [slipped on
the carpet, mat slipped
on the floor]?

Mr. Gray:

No, I understand
that
aspect.
I understand
that
it
would
normally,
rebuttal
on
something like that would
be
appropriate.
The
problem is that this is
the same thing he said in
his deposition
a long
time ago.
He said he
stepped on the mat, it
slipped,
then he went
forward on the floor, his
foot did, and then he
went into the wall. This
is not anything new.

(R. 1263-64.)
The lower court concluded that Rahmeyer was a rebuttal
witness and allowed him to testify.
The court orders that the rebuttal witness
[Rahmeyer] is permitted to testify regarding
both issues on the rug:
whether or not the
plaintiff [Curtis] slipped because of a slick
surface on the rug, and then slipped on the
13

adjoining tile; or whether or not the bottom
or the back of the rug, next to the tile,
slipped, and the rug fell from under the feet
of the plaintiff.
(R. 1275-76.)
However, a comparison of the Curtis deposition testimony
and the trial transcript shows that Curtis did not change his
story, so the court's conclusion that Rahmeyer was a proper
rebuttal witness was wrong.

That portion of Curtis' deposition

describing the slip and fall is attached in the Addendum to this
Brief.

Abstracts of the deposition follow:
Q:

When you stepped through the door, you
stepped onto the mat?

A:

Correct.

Q:

Did the mat move at that point?

A:

No.
*

*

*

Q:

Okay, now why don't you describe for me
what happened as you approached the north
end of the mat.

A:

I got closer to the end, I assume, I
turned around. I started to slip and I
tried to grasp but my feet came off of
the mat. My right foot had come off of
the mat and I popped my neck and felt my
neck pop and I started twisting and I
ended up falling into the wall.
*

Q:

*

*

The left foot slipped?
Did your left
foot slip on the mat or did the mat move
when your left foot struck the mat?
14

A:

My foot — I would just say the mat
moved.
Kind of a motion like it was
coming back.

A:

Let me say that to you one more time.
Maybe I threw you and I might have threw
myself at that point. As I came through
and made the turn I opened the door. I
came to the door and I just walked normal
and my foot slipped as I got closer to
the end like the mat was coming with it.
And then I kind of went into a squirrelly
position trying to grab my balance
because as my other foot came off, I was
going every which way and had popped my
neck at that point.

A:

I did not assume that the mat was wet. I
really had no knowledge of what part of
it was wet, the floor or the mat.

(Deposition of Erman Curtis, 29th day of September, 1992, p. 37,
Ins. 19-23; p. 38, Ins. 3-11, 21-25; p. 39, Ins. 21-25; p. 40, lns0
1-5; p. 46, Ins. 16-18.)
Curtis' deposition testimony is essentially identical to
that which he gave at trial.

At the trial, Curtis described the

event as follows:
When I got to the end of the mat, I felt like
the mat had slipped back and I had started
slipping. I assume my right foot went off of
the mat at that point and I don't know what
way I was going at that point other than I
ended up into the wall on my right knee.
(R. 1253, Ins. 17-24.)
In summary, contrary to the allegations of L&N, Curtis
did not change his legal or factual theories at the trial* Hence,
15

the Rahmeyer testimony clearly was not rebuttal testimony. It was,
as set forth in Appellant's Brief, mostly cumulative testimony.
Since L&N mistakenly represented that Rahmeyer was a
rebuttal witness, and since the sole and erroneous basis for the
lower court allowing Rahmeyer to testify was the lower court's
conclusion that Rahmeyer was a rebuttal witness, this Court should
label Rahmeyer's testimony for what it was —

surprise testimony

warranting a new trial pursuant to U.R.C.P. 59.
POINT IV
The Record Unquestionably Demonstrates
That L&N Did Not Timely Disclose
Dr. Rahmeyer As Its Second Expert Witness
And That Curtis Was Prejudiced
By the Last-Minute Disclosure.
L&N is wrong when it alleges that Dr. Rahmeyer was
properly and timely disclosed to Curtis (Brief of Appellee, pp. 1516).

L&N is also incorrect when it says that Rules 16, 26, 33 and

4-502 do not apply or were satisfied (Brief of Appellee, p. 16).
The record discloses otherwise.
The lower court's one and only Scheduling Order entered
pursuant to U.R.C.P. 16 required discovery to be completed by March
1, 1993 (R. 49-51). By Stipulation and Order, the parties extended
the discovery cut-off date to March 25, 1993 (R. 62-64).
Rule

26(b)(4)(a)(1)

allows

litigants

to

serve

an

interrogatory requiring the other party to identify each person

16

whom the other party expects to call as an expert.

Curtis served

such an interrogatory, and L&N answered as follows:
L&N Uniform intends to call Mr. David Pete
Gordon as an expert witness (Brief of
Appellant, Addendum Exhibit 3).
Pursuant

to

Rule

26(e),

L&N

was

under

a duty

to

supplement its answer to the interrogatory.
Thereafter, L&N requested and obtained a continuance of
the trial so that it could conduct additional discovery (R. 12226).

The trial was continued to September 7, 1993, but the court

did not extend the discovery cut-off date (R. 125-26).

By August

26, 1993, the depositions of each party's sole expert were taken
(R. 116-19, 138-39).
At trial, the lower court was informed that during the
summer of 1993, counsel had a gentlemen's agreement to extend the
discovery cut-off date.
agreement (R. 1225).

The court asked each side to explain the

Curtis' counsel replied that L&N's counsel

"would have to speak to the oral agreement because I wasn't there"
(R. 825). Whereupon, L&N's counsel told the court:
Before the initial discovery cut-off expired,
plaintiff [Curtis], through his counsel,
wanted to take the deposition of Pete Gordon,
our expert. He identified that he lives in La
Grange, Georgia. I was advised at that time
that Walter Thomas was their expert, and he
also resided in the Georgia area and wanted to
know if we could take their depositions at the
same time.
I agreed to that. We went to
Georgia. They took Mr. Gordon's deposition
first. I took Walter Thomas' deposition.
17

At that time, he told me that he didn't have
any opinions.
*

*

*

I then pursued with Mr. Sullivan when we could
take Mr. Thomas' deposition.
Beyond the
initial discovery cut-off, Mr. Thomas was not
available.
He didn't have his finalized
opinions. I agreed to go ahead and take his
deposition even though discovery had been cut
off because I had been told of Mr. Thomas . .
. . We took his deposition 12 days before
trial [12 days before the September 7th trial
date].
(R. 1225-26.)
L&N's counsel went on to say, "That's when [August 26,
1993] I told Steve [Curtis' counsel] that I was going to get my own
expert" (R. 1226).

L&N's counsel then mistakenly told the court

that, "I immediately advised them of his [Rahmeyer's] identity and
that

he

was

available

for

testimony.

They

could

take

deposition and do whatever they wanted to do" (R. 1226).

his

However,

later L&N's counsel acknowledged that he did not immediately notify
Curtis

of

Rahmeyer's

identity.

In

fact,

Rahmeyer's identity until October 1, 1993 —

he

did

not

five weeks later.

As soon as I was prepared, as soon as I knew I
was going to use him as a witness, I advised
them as soon as his opinions were finalized.
If I had told them on October 1, I would have
said that we had contacted a guy by the name
of Bill Rahmeyer. As soon as his testimony is
done, we will let you know so that we can take
his deposition.
(R. 1270.)
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reveal

On October 5 th, the court held a pre-trial settlement
conference.
witness.

However, L&N did not disclose Rahmeyer as an expert

Twenty-three days later, and 18 days prior to trial, L&N

finally notified Curtis that it was going to call Rahmeyer (R. 17980; R. 865, Ins. 10-27).
For approximately two months prior to the disclosure, L&N
knew it was going to call Rahmeyer as its expert witness (R. 1270,
1310-11).
When L&N finally disclosed Rahmeyer, Curtis told L&N to
file a Rule 4-502 motion.

When L&N refused, Curtis moved for a

protective order and requested the court to exclude Rahmeyer as a
witness (R. 177-192).

The trial court considered the motion on the

next to the last day of trial. At the hearing, L&N told the court
that Rahmeyer was necessary to rebut the testimony of Curtis (R.
1300).

However, as set forth in Point III of this Brief, Rahmeyer

was not a rebuttal witness.
In summary, in no way, shape or form did L&N timely
supplement its answer and name Rahmeyer as an expert witness. The
ways in which Curtis was prejudiced are set forth on pages 19-21 of
the Appellant's opening Brief.

To summarize, Curtis could not

obtain rebuttal testimony at that late date, and Curtis could not
effectively cross-examine Rahmeyer.
Moreover, there is no question that the error in allowing
the last-minute testimony had a substantial influence in bringing
19

about a different verdict. In contrast to the case of Bambrouah v.
Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286, 1290 (Utah 1976), cited in L&N's Brief, the
evidence erroneously admitted is not of limited scope.

By use of

the improper testimony, L&N was able to convince the jury that
Curtis was less likely to slip on a wet surface than on a dry one,
so L&N could not have been negligent and could not have caused
Curtis to slip and fall.
Finally, this case is not like Barrett v. Denver & Rio
Grande W. R. , 830 P.2d 291 (Utah 1991) (also cited in Curtis'
Brief).

In Barrett, there was no discovery cut-off date Order. In

this case, there was an Order, but the parties informally extended
the discovery to the September 7, 1993 trial date. There was not,
however, any agreement to extend the cut-off date beyond that
point.

Thus, the Court should have excluded the last-minute

surprise testimony.
VI.
CONCLUSION
Curtis timely objected to the lack of foundation for
L&N's expert testimony. Moreover, the Court committed plain error
when it allowed L&N's experts to describe their experiments and the
conclusions derived therefrom.
was not rebuttal testimony.

In addition, Rahmeyerfs testimony
Finally, the record unquestionably

shows that L&N did not timely disclose Rahmeyer as an expert
witness, and that Curtis was prejudiced by the late disclosure.
20

For these reasons, the Judgment should be vacated and the
case remanded for trial.
Respectfully submitted this 12th day of April, 1995.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant

ALBERT W. GRAY
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1 I know?
2 1

A.

I don't know.

3

Q.

Were they the same color?

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

When you -- apparently you came down a

6
7

hall and then turned to the east -A.

No.

As I came out of the office I would

8

turn to the west and then go south and then I would

9

again turn west.

10

And after entering a door I woulc*

be heading back north.

11 J

Q.

Okay.

12

A.

It comes like this, like this, like this

13
14 J

I understand.

and then back in.
Q.

And as you were headed back north,

15 I that's when the accident occurred.

Correct?

16

A.

Correct.

17 J

Q.

Now, why don't you describe for me, in

18

as much detail as you can remember, how the accident

19 I happened.
20

A.

Okay.

I turned around and came out and

21

I walked down, like I stated before, down and made

22

the turn and I walked across the first one.

23

didn't pay attention to what I walked across.

24

come out, I am walking, picking my feet up.

25

mat, the last mat as I came through had moved a
Diana Kent, C.S.R., R.P.R.

I
I
The

1

little bit which I slipped at.

2
3

Q.

I started to slip.

Why don't you describe what you mean by

that for me.

4

A.

As if your feet are there, my feet

5

slipped on the one mat and it had moved when I

6

tried

—

7

Q.

The very first one you walked across?

8 J

A.

No.

The second mat.

After I came

9 I through the door.
10 I

Q.

So when you stepped on it, it moved

12

A.

Up by the front part of it.

13

Q.

Do you have any idea as to the

11

some?

14 J dimensions of the mat?
15

A.

I have no idea how long they are.

16

Q.

Was it three feet wide, I assume,

17
18 J

something like that?
A.

I can't assume it is three feet wide

19

because I really don't know the width of it.

20

know is it is a hallway mat.

21

Q.

Okay.

22

A.

Longer, yes.

23 J

Q.

I'm trying to get some feeling for

24
25 I

All I

Was it longer than it was wide?

whether it was a long rectangle.
A.

It was longer than it was wide, yes.
Diana Kent, C.S.R., R.P.R.
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1 I

Q.

By a significant amount?

Was it twice

2 I as long as it was wide?
3 |

A.

Possibly.

4 I

Q.

Okay.

And so when you first stepped on

5 | it as you just turned and headed north, you said the
6 I mat moved some. Is that correct?
7

A.

8

heading north.

9

Q.

Right.

10

A.

And it is like maybe a one, two step and

11

As I got closer to the end of the mat,
I already came through the door.

here you are at the end of it.

12

Q.

13

Was the mat -- were there a couple of

steps on the regular floor, the flooring?

14

A.

In between it?

15

Q.

Yes.

Before you reach the mat, or was

16 I the mat there as soon as you walked to the north?
17
18

A.

As soon as I opened the door the mat was

Q.

When you stepped through the door you

there.

19
20

stepped onto the mat?

21

A.

Correct.

22

Q.

Did the mat move at that point?

23

A.

No.

24

Q.

And then you continued whatever number

25 J of steps you were until you got towards the north

L
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1

end of the mat.

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

Okay.

4

Nov, why don't you describe for

me what happened as you approached the north end of

5 I the mat.
6
7

A.

I got closer to the end, I assume, and

turned around and I started to slip and I tried to

8 I grasp but my feet came off the mat.
9

My right foot

had came off the mat and I popped my neck and felt

10 J my neck pop and I started twisting and I ended up
11

falling into the wall.

12
13

Q.

Okay.

Let me ask you some questions.

Were you carrying anything at that point?

14

A.

No.

15

Q.

Now, were you just walking normally to

16

the north when you started to slip?

17

A.

Correct.

18

Q.

Okay.

19

to slip first?

20

A.

Left.

21

Q.

The left foot slipped.

Do you recall which foot started

Did your left

22 J foot slip on the mat or did the mat move when your
23

left foot struck the mat?

24 J
25 | moved.

A.

My foot -- I would just say the mat
Kind of a motion like it was coming back*
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1

Q.

Okay.

I think you indicated you had

2

been picking your feet up so you didn't scuff

3

anything or stumble on anything?

4

A.

No, sir.

5

Q.

Okay.

6

humps in the mat?

7

A.

None.

8

Q.

Okay.

9

Were there any ripples or, say,

So the mat, when you turned the

corner to step onto the mat, it was properly flat?

10

A.

As far as I know.

11

Q.

Okay.

And then as you got towards the

12

end of the mat, when your left foot came down, then

13

the mat slipped.

Is that correct?

14

A.

Correct.

15

Q.

Okay.

The only reason I'm asking is you

16

said you turned around and the mat slipped.

17

that is why I wanted to make sure that you were

18

walking in the straight north direction and as you

19

were just normally walking, that's when your left

20

foot came down and the mat began to slip.

21

A.

And

Let me say that to you one more time.

22

Maybe I threw you and I might have threw myself at

23

that point.

24

opened the door, I came to the door and I just

25

walked normal and my foot slipped as I got closer to

As I came through and made the turn, I
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1 | the end, like the mat was coming with it.

And then

2 I I kind of went into a squirrelly position, trying to
3

grab my balance because, as my other foot came off,

4 I I was going every which way and it popped my neck at
5 I that point.
6
7

Q.

actually started --

8
9

So both feet were on the mat when you

A.

No.

Both my feet were not on the mat.

When I started into the door

—

10

Q.

No.

11 I

A.

When I started to slip?

12

Q.

Yes.

13 I

A.

My left foot was, because I was bringing

14

See, you may have misunderstood.

the right foot off.

15

Q.

Your right foot had been on the mat and

16

your left foot, you stepped forward and as you

17

picked up your right foot on your stride, the mat

18 I slipped?
19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

So it wasn't as you were placing your

21

left foot down that the mat slipped.

22

sense?

Does that make

23

A.

No, it doesn't.

24

Q.

As people walk, there's some point where

25

both feet are on the ground and you pick up one foot
Diana Kent, C.S.R., R.P.R.
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1

and set that down and both feet are on the ground

2 I for a moment and then you pick up the next foot.
3

Correct?

That's the way most people walk.

4

A.

Okay.

5

Q.

And it is difficult sometimes to

6

verbalize these things and to say them so that the

7

record is clear, and that's one of the reasons that

8

I'm kind of struggling with this.

9

make sure when, in the process of your normal

10

stride, this accident occurred.

And I want to

And I guess what

11 J I'm trying to find out is was it when you stepped
12

down with your left foot that the mat slipped or was

13

it when you picked up your right foot and started

14

your next stride that your left foot slipped?

Does

15 J that make sense?
16 I
17

A.

back what you said.

18
19

Give me one second and let me run that

Q.
answer.

I'm not concerned about the substantive
I want to make sure that you understand my

20 J question.
21 I

A.

I'm trying to understand what you are

22

saying there.

I guess it would be my left foot.

I

23

picked my right up to move and the left was the one

24

that started to move.

25

move.

That's when it started to

My left foot would be going and my right foot
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1 I would be coming down.
2
3

Q.

Right.

I guess what I'm trying to say

is -- you have lived in Utah your whole life,

4 J haven't you?
5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

So I'm sure there have been times when,

7

as you have been walking out in the winter time, you

8

have had to walk across areas that are slippery with

9

snow or ice.

Correct?

10

A.

Definitely.

11 J

Q.

There are times when you put your foot

12

down and step on something that is slippery and as

13

you put your foot down that's when your foot

14

slides.

You have experienced that, haven't you?

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

And what I'm trying to find out is

17

whether that was the way this accident happened;

18

that as you put your foot down, that's when your

19

balance was lost and the mat moved or whether you

20 I were there and you felt like you were stable and a?
21

you picked up your right foot to continue your step

22

or your stride, that's when the mat moved and caused

23

you to lose your balance.

24
25

A.

At that point I didn't have even an

opportunity, when I got to that, started to move, I
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1

couldn't tell you which foot was flying which way

2

other than the left foot when I come back, and then

3

when my right foot was down, I was every which way.
Q.

4
5

Did you feel like your weight was on

your left foot when the mat slipped?

6

A.

Correct.

7

Q.

Okay.

8

try to regain your balance?
A.

9
10

Yes.

I was slipping.

I left scuff

marks all over the place.
Q.

11
12

And as a result, you twisted to

Okay.

Did you ever actually fall down

onto the ground?

13

A.

I ended up on my knee and into the wall.

14

Q.

Which knee did you hit?

15

A.

My right knee.

16

Q.

And your right shoulder into the wall?

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

Was your right knee on the regular floor

19

or was it on the mat?

20

A.

It was on the regular floor.

21

Q.

Was that to the north of the end of the

23

A.

North.

24

Q.

Okay.

22

25

mat?

You say you left scuff marks.

Was that on the floor or was that a figure of speech
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1

or what?

2

A.

Well, I call it scuff marks.

It was a

3

moisture and the dirt from the bottom of your

4

shoes.

5

the black marks on there where the moisture was.

6
7

Your feet.

Q.

Off your shoes.

You could see

What kind of shoes were you wearing at

the time?

8

A.

Cowboy boots.

9

Q.

What kind of cowboy boots, do you

10

recall?

11

A.

Tony Llamas.

12

Q.

Do you know what kind of sole they had?

13

A.

No.

14

Q.

Do you still have those?

15

A.

Yes, I do.

16

Q.

Have they been resoled?

17

A.

No.

18

Q.

Were there actual marks left on the

19

flooring from your boots as you were trying to

20

regain your balance?

21

A.

Black marks is what I said.

22

Q.

And what kind of flooring was it

23
24
25

underneath the mat?
A.
something.

What is it?

Linoleum or tile or

I imagine it would be linoleum because
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1

we buff it.

2

Q.

3

approximately?

4

A.

No.

5

Q.

Was it wide enough that you could stand

Okay.

Do you know how wide the hall is,

Probably three feet, four feet.

6

with your arms outstretched on both sides and touch

7

the sides of both walls?

8

A.

I don't know.

9

Q.

Okay.

I never tried it.

You said you felt your neck pop.

10

Do you recall where, during the process of losing

11

your balance and things, that that happened?

12

A.

Right at first is all I know.

13

Q.

Okay.

14

And then you went down to your

right knee?
A.

15

Well, I twisted prior to going down to

16

my right knee and ended up into the corner and I had

17

my knee up and my shoulder was into the wall.

18

Q.

Okay.

Was it along the side of the

19

wall, as I understand which would probably be the

20

east side of that hall?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

Somewhere to the north of the end of the

24

A.

Correct.

25

Q.

Was it a foot or two feet or do you have

23

It would be the east side.

mat?

Diana Kent, C.S.R.,
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1 I any idea as to how far that was?
2 I

A,

I have no idea how far it was.

3

Q.

Okay.

You indicated that you felt like

4 I there was some moisture on the mat.
5
6
7

A.
on the mat.
Q.

I didn't indicate that it was moisture
I had no idea what had caused this.
Okay.

Maybe I misunderstood.

I thought

8

you mentioned something about the dirt on the bottom

9

of your shoes and the moisture from that.

10 I

A.

This was off where I had made the mats

11 I basically right here.
12

And I felt myself all over

this floor right at the edge of that mat.

13

Q.

Right.

14

A.

So I assumed that this thing is wet.

15

Q.

Okay.

16

A.

I did not assume that the mat was wet.

17

I really had no knowledge of what part of it was

18 J wet, the floor or the mat.
19
20
21

Q.

Okay.

And so what happened after you

fell into the wall then?
A.

Well, I probably sat there for probably

22

about 15, 20 seconds and I started to get up and one

23

of the dispatch drivers was coming into the hall

24

while I was still into the side of the wall.

25

Q.

And do you know his name?
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